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State and Local Government Authority to
Ban or Regulate Nuclear Reactors for the
Purpose of Protecting Psychological
Health
William S. Jordan III*
I. Introduction
On May 24, 1982, in People Against Nuclear Energy (PANE)
v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled that the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)' requires the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission to consider the possibility of psychological
health damage to the surrounding population when it decides
whether to authorize the restart of Three Mile Island Unit No. 1
(TMI-1), which was not damaged in the accident that crippled Unit
No. 2 (TMI-2). The court also ruled that the Atomic Energy Act'
does not require the Commission to consider psychological health
damage when making the TMI-1 restart decision.4 Reaction to this
decision was swift; the Washington Post complained that it would
"damage both the keystone of environmental law and the future of
nuclear power," while the Wall Street Journal described the deci-
sion as a "below-the-belt punch."' The Post urged a prompt appeal.
* B.A. 1971, Stanford University; J.D. 1974, University of Michigan. The author is a
partner in the public interest law firm of Harmon, Weiss & Jordan in Washington, D.C., and
represented People Against Nuclear Energy in the case discussed in this article. Mr. Jordan
published an article entitled, "Psychological Harm after PANE: NEPA's Requirement to Mit-
igate Psychological Damage" at 8 HARVARD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW 55 (1984).
1. 678 F.2d 222 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Judge Skelly Wright authored the portion of the
opinion in which the court held that NEPA requires the NRC to consider a restart's impact on
psychological health, 678 F.2d at 249-54. Judge McGowan concurred in that portion of Judge
Wright's opinion, while Judge Wilkey dissented from it. Id. at 236-49 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1976).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1976).
4. 678 F.2d at 249-54. Judge Wilkey authored the AEA portion of the Court's opinion
in which Judge McGowen concurred. Judge Wright dissented in a separate opinion. Id. at 254-
57 (Wright, J., dissenting).
5. Washington Post, May 21, 1983, at A20, col. I.
6. Wall Street Journal, January 12, 1982, at I, col. 1. The editorial was published
before the court's opinions because the court of appeals issued a judgment without opinions on
January 7, 1982; the ultimate judgment and opinions were not published until May 14, 1982.
Neither editorial mentioned the Atomic Energy Act decision.
On April 19, 1983, the United States Supreme Court reversed
the NEPA portion of the circuit court's decision.8 Since PANE,
which had raised the issue of psychological health damage from the
restart of TMI-1, did not seek certiorari from the lower court's ad-
verse ruling under the Atomic Energy Act,9 it appeared that the Nu-
clear Regulatory Commission and the nuclear power industry had
been relieved of the burden of confronting the question whether nu-
clear accidents might cause unacceptable psychological health dam-
age. The Post applauded the result, but noted that, "Common sense
should have led the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to hear all ob-
jections of persons opposed to reopening TMI. The failure at that
site was a frightening and disruptive experience for those who live in
the area." 10
Indeed, the failure of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to
prevent the accident at Three Mile Island, coupled with its refusal to
consider the impact of a possible restart of TMI-1 on the psychologi-
cal well-being of local residents, has contributed to a political cli-
mate of substantial opposition to the reopening." Ironically, on the
same day that the Post applauded the Supreme Court's decision re-
garding psychological health damage at Three Mile Island, the
Court issued a second opinion that effectively places the future of
Three Mile Island and other nuclear reactors in the hands of any
state or local government that has the political will and the authority
under state law to regulate activities for the purpose of protecting
human psychological health.12
Until recently, most have assumed that states and localities
have no significant role to play in the regulation of nuclear reactors.
Thus, when the Nuclear Regulatory Commission refused to consider
the possible psychological impact of a decision to restart TMI-1,
Commissioner Gilinsky expressed concern that "nowhere in govern-
ment - local, state, or federal - can the concerns at issue here be
considered, short of an act of Congress."' 3
7. Washington Post, May 21, 1983, at A20, col. 1.
8. Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 103 S. Ct. 1556 (1983).
9. Id. at 1555-56 n.5.
10. . . . And the TMI Case, Washington Post, April 22, 1983, at A14, col. 2.
11. This climate is indicated most clearly by a referendum held on May 18, 1982, in
which residents of the three counties surrounding Three Mile Island (Cumberland, Dauphin
and York) voted by a 2-1 margin to oppose the restart of TMI-1. The Patriot (Harrisburg),
May 19, 1982, at 1.
12. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Dev. Comm'n,
103 S. Ct. 1713 (1983).
13. Metropolitan Edison Co. (TMI-1), 15 N.R.C. 407, 419 (1982) (Statement of Com-
missioner Gilinsky). See also Metropolitan Edison Co. (TMI-l), 12 N.R.C. 607, 619 (1980)
(Statement of Commissioner Gilinsky regarding certified question on the psychological stress
issue).
The Commissioner's concern was unfounded. Since the Com-
mission 14 and the United States Court of Appeals15 have held that
the Atomic Energy Act does not extend protection to psychological
health, the Commission has no jurisdiction over the psychological
health effects of nuclear power. As a result, states and localities now
have full authority, subject to minimal limitations, to ban or regulate
nuclear reactors to protect the psychological health of nearby
communities.
II. Principles of Federal Preemption Applied to Nuclear Power
In 1976, the State of California enacted statutes known as the
"Nuclear Laws." 6 These statutes prohibit the construction and op-
eration of any new nuclear reactor in California until the State En-
ergy Resources Conservation and Development Commission deter-
mines that "a demonstrated technology or means for the disposal of
high-level nuclear waste has been developed" and that the federal
government has approved the technology or disposal method. The
Supreme Court upheld these provisions in a challenge brought by a
California utility.18
The Nuclear Laws and the litigation that stemmed from them
have generated considerable comment, both on the narrow issue of
federal preemption in the nuclear area 9 and on the broader issue of
federal preemption theory, with nuclear power as the focus of discus-
sion. Among the most comprehensive and persuasive of the commen-
taries is an article by Professor Wiggins, 0 which discusses federal
preemption theory and serves as a starting point for this article.21
14. Id.
15. 678 F.2d at 250.
16. CAL. Pun. REs. CODE §§ 25000-25986 (West 1977 and Supp. 1983).
17. Id. § 25524.2. The Supreme Court has ruled on the substantive validity of only this
section of the Nuclear Laws. The Nuclear Laws also (1) prohibit operation of nuclear plants
that require reprocessing of fuel rods, id. § 24424.1(a), (2) require that each nuclear reactor
have "adequate capacity" for the storage of spent fuel rods when such storage is needed, id. §
25524.1(b), and (3) place a moratorium on the certification of new nuclear reactors pending
issuance of a report declaring whether underground placement and berm containment are nec-
essary for enhancing the public health and safety. Id. § 25524.3. The Court determined that
challenges to these provisions were not ripe for litigation. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 103 S. Ct. at
1718-19. See also Pac. Legal Found. v. State Energy Resources Conserv. and Dev. Comm'n,
659 F.2d 903, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1981).
18. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 103 S. Ct. at 1732.
19. See, e.g., Henderson, The Nuclear Choice: Are Health and Safety Issues Pre-
empted?, 8 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 821 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Henderson].
20. Wiggins, Federalism Balancing and the Burger Court: California's Nuclear Law as
a Preemption Case Study, 13 U.C. D. L. REV. 3 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Wiggins].
21. See also Henderson, supra note 19, at 872 (concluding that "the preemptive areas of
NRC jurisdiction is [sic] limited to those licensing and other regulatory areas that- the Atomic
Energy Act delegates to NRC control, i.e., plant design, construction, operation, and other
technical matters.") The logic of the Supreme Court's decision on the California Nuclear
Laws may extend this far; the holding itself, however, does not. See also Meek, Nuclear Power
and State Radiation Protection Measures: The Impotence of Preemption, 10 ENVTL. L. I
The purpose of this article is not to repeat previously published anal-
yses, but to place Pacific Gas & Electric Co., v. State Energy Re-
sources Conservation and Development Commission2 in the context
revealed by these commentaries and to apply that decision to the
question of state regulation of nuclear reactors for the purpose of
protecting human psychological health.
Although the Supreme Court has not always been consistent in
applying preemption principles, 3 the Court in the past decade has
issued eight major opinions that provide more guidance and certainty
than was previously available. 4 Preemption theory now is guided by
what Professor Wiggins terms a "state-supportive presumption,"
under which "the maintenance of state regulatory authority has be-
come a guiding principle. '2 5 Given this presumption, Wiggins identi-
fies and analyzes the following categories and subcategories of fed-
eral preemption:
1. Occupation preemption, under which the federal government
has so thoroughly occupied the field that there is no room for state
action: (a) Preemption arising from the comprehensiveness of the
federal scheme. (b) Preemption arising from the national character
of the subject matter. (c) Preemption arising from the Congressional
purpose.
2. Conflict preemption, under which the state action must give
way because it conflicts with the federal program: (a) Preemption
arising from the fact that state requirements are inconsistent with
federal requirements. (b) Preemption arising from the fact that the
state program or requirement stands as an obstacle to accomplish-
ment of the federal purpose.2" Professor Wiggins' analysis indicates
that occupation preemption is rapidly fading as a source of federal
preemption of state action or authority. He concludes that, in light
of New York Department of Social Services v. Dublino2 7 and De
(1979) (also providing a greater restriction than the Court imposed on federal preemption in
the nuclear area, but with a comprehensive analysis); Note, May a State Say "No" to Nu-
clear Power? Pacific Legal Foundation Gives a Disappointing Answer, 10 ENVTL. L. 189
(1979) (discussing the district court decision in Pac. Legal Found. v. State Energy Resources
Conserv. and Dev. Comm'n, 472 F. Supp. 191 (S.D.Cal. 1979), and arguing for a denial of
federal preemption); Note, California's Nuclear Power Plant Siting Legislation: A Preemp-
tion Analysis, 52 U.S.C.L. REv. 1189 (1979) (concluding that the Nuclear Laws are
preempted).
22. 103 S. Ct. 1713 (1983).
23. Wiggins, supra note 20, at 24.
24. Id. at 25. As identified by Professor Wiggins, these opinions are: Ray v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978); Jones V. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977); De
Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974);
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973); New York Dep't of
Soc. Serv. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973); City
of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
25. Wiggins, supra note 20, at 26-30.
26. Id. at 30-45.
27. 413 U.S. 405 (1973).
Canas v. Bica,'s "the comprehensiveness of a federal legislative
scheme no longer is held to indicate Congressional intent to occupy
the field." 29 He also finds "increasing reluctance to infer preemption
because the subject matter regulated by the state requires uniform
national rules." 0 Finally, he concludes that concepts of preemption
arising from the congressional purpose do not depend upon federal
occupation of the field, but upon perceived conflicts between federal
and state programs or authority and thus fall under the conflict pre-
emption analysis.8"
Thus, the state supportive presumption appears to be evolving
into a virtual limitation of federal preemption to areas of federal-
state conflict. Indeed, dicta in Goldstein v. California,"2 indicate that
the Court will distinguish between "those situations in which the
concurrent exercise of a power by the Federal Government and the
States or by the States alone may possibly lead to conflicts and those
situations where conflicts will necessarily arise." The possibility of
conflict is not sufficient for state action to be preempted; there must
be nearly a prediction of actual conflict. 8  The remaining question is
the extent of the showing that must be made to meet the standard.
A. Pacific Gas & Electric
The Supreme Court's preemption discussion in Pacific Gas &
Electric begins with a summary of the categories identified by Pro-
fessor Wiggins four years earlier.84 From the Court's discussion, it
appears that both categories and all five subcategories remain vital
28. 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
29. Wiggins, supra note 20, at 40.
30. Id. at 35, relying primarily on Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 554 (1973), in
which the Supreme Court held that the comprehensive national copyright law did not involve
an issue so "necessarily national in import" that it precluded some parallel state protections.
(emphasis in original).
31. Wiggins, supra note 20, at 40.
32. 412 U.S. 546, 554-55 (1973) (emphasis in original).
33. Wiggins, supra note 20, at 45.
34. The Court stated,
It is well-established that within Constitutional limits Congress may preempt
state authority by so stating in express terms. Absent explicit preemptive lan-
guage, Congress' intent to supercede state law altogether may be found from a
"scheme of federal regulation so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference
that Congress left no room to supplement it, because the Act of Congress may
touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system
will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the subject," or be-
cause "the object sought to be obtained by the federal law and the character of
obligations imposed by it may reveal the same purpose." Even where Congress
has not entirely displaced state regulation in a specific area, state law is pre-
empted to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law. Such a conflict
arises when "compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical
impossibility" or where state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 103 S. Ct. at 1722.
preemption principles. That appearance is undermined, however, by
the cases on which the Court relies. While Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp.85 hinged on a finding that the statutory scheme demonstrated
a "clear and manifest purpose of Congress" to occupy the field, Fi-
delity Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n v. de le Cuesta6 turned on a
conflict in which enforcement of state law was perceived as under-
mining the federal regulation.
37
More recently, the Court emphasized the extremely limited
scope of occupation preemption when it upheld state regulation of
wholesale electric rates charged by Rural Electric Cooperatives, even
though most wholesale rates historically had been regulated by the
federal government. 8 Justice White vehemently dissented, arguing
that "Congress has occupied the field of wholesale power regula-
tion." 3' His dissent highlights the decline and virtual demise of the
principle of occupation preemption.
Despite the trend noted by Justice White, the Pacific Gas &
Electric decision, while upholding the California Nuclear Laws, ex-
plicitly preserves the doctrine of occupation preemption. The Court
simply narrowed this occupied field to "nuclear safety concerns," ap-
parently meaning "the radiological safety aspects involved in the
construction and operation of a nuclear plant."'4 0
The Court foreshadowed the ultimate decision in its first sen-
tence of analysis:
Even a brief perusal of the Atomic Energy Act reveals that, de-
spite its comprehensiveness, it does not at any point expressly
require the States to construct or authorize nuclear power plants
or prohibit the States from deciding, as an absolute or condi-
tional matter, not to permit the construction of any further
reactors.4 '
Rejecting the argument that the Atomic Energy Act rendered "the
federal government. . .the sole regulator of all matters nuclear," the
Court emphasized the distinction between the federal responsibility
for the radiological safety aspects of nuclear power and the states'
35. 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
36. 102 S. Ct. 3014 (1982).
37. The state law at issue prohibited mortgage banks from exercising due-on-sale clauses
in home mortgages. The Court held that the law conflicted with a Federal Home Loan Bank
Board regulation that expressly permitted federally chartered institutions to exercise such
clauses. Although it would have been possible to comply with both provisions, the Court held
the state law invalid because it conflicted with the Board's objective of assuring "economic
soundness of the thrift industry" by allowing thrift institutions to call in loans when houses
were sold. Id. at 3022-23.
38. Arkansas Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 51 U.S.L.W. 4539
(1983).
39. Id. at 4540.
40. Pac. Gas. & Elec. Co., 103 S. Ct. at 1723.
41. Id. at 1722.
"traditional responsibility in the field of regulating electric utilities
for determining questions of need, reliability, cost and other related
state concerns. 42
The Court's ensuing analysis first emphasized that the "[n]eed
for new power facilities, their economic feasibility, and rates and ser-
vices, are areas that have been characteristically governed by the
States."48 Second, the Court recognized that in areas traditionally
occupied by the states, the analysis should "start with the assump-
tion that the historic police powers of the States were not to be su-
perseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress."4 Third, the Court noted that Congress has
never given the NRC authority "over the generation of electricity
itself, or over the economic question whether a particular plant
should be built," but explicitly left such matters in state hands.45
Finally, the Court declared that the Atomic Energy Act"' explicitly
identifies the sphere of activity left to the states as regulation of ac-
tivities "for purposes other than protection against radiation
hazards.' These points appear to establish that state action regard-
ing nuclear power is preempted if it involves nuclear safety issues,
but not otherwise.
This conclusion is supported by the Court's rejection of the
broader proposition that a state may prohibit completely construc-
tion of new nuclear reactors until the state's safety concerns are sat-
isfied.48 Thus, the Court found that in a nuclear power area in which
states traditionally have been active, the field was not federally occu-
pied or preempted. The Court, however, did apply the occupation
doctrine to the field that it had identified as embodying the scope of
federal activity.
The Court, therefore, upheld Section 25524.2 of the California
Nuclear Laws4 9 because the statute was based upon a nonsafety ra-
tionale."' This rationale derived from California's avowed purpose of
preventing economic disruption that might arise from the inability to
dispose of used nuclear fuel that would create "a 'clog' in the nu-
42. Id. at 1722-23.
43. Id. at 1723.
44. Id. (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
45. Id. at 1724.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) (1976).
47. The Court inferred this conclusion from the provision. The language technically lim-
its only § 274 and not the entire Atomic Energy Act. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 103 S. Ct. at
1725.
48. The Court stated as follows: "We reject this line of reasoning. State safety regula-
tion is not preempted only when it conflicts with federal law. Rather, the federal government
has occupied the entire field of nuclear safety concerns, except the limited powers expressly
ceded to the states." Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 103 S. Ct. at 1726.
49. See supra notes 16 and 17.
50. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 103 S. Ct. at 1727-28.
clear fuel cycle" and "lead to unpredictably high costs to contain the
problem or, worse, shutdowns in reactors."8 1
The Court rejected two arguments that raised alleged conflicts
between state law and the Atomic Energy Act's regulatory scheme.
The first argument was based upon the NRC's decision to permit the
continued licensing of reactors despite unsolved waste disposal
problems and upon Congress' recent passage of legislation directed
at that problem. The second argument relied upon the fact that a
primary purpose of the Atomic Energy Act is to promote nuclear
power.58
The Court dismissed the first argument because a conflict sim-
ply was not possible, given the different purposes of the federal and
state statutes:
Because the NRC order does not and could not compel a utility
to develop a nuclear plant, compliance with both it and §
25524.2 are possible. Moreover, because the NRC's regulations
are aimed at insuring that plants are safe, not necessarily that
they are economical, § 25524.2 does not interfere with the ob-
jective of the federal regulation.54
Regarding the second argument, the Court affirmed the force of the
congressional purpose to promote the development of nuclear power,
but held that "Congress has left sufficient authority in the states to
allow the development of nuclear power to be slowed or even stopped
for economic reasons."55
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Stevens, concurred in the
decision, but strongly disputed the Court's conclusion that a state
could not ban nuclear power for nuclear safety considerations, rather
than for other reasons.8 6 Justice Blackmun rejected both the Court's
emphasis on the statutory purpose of promoting nuclear power and
the proposition that a state could not ban nuclear reactors for safety
reasons.
57
51. Id. at 1727. The Court's acceptance of California's avowed economic rationale ap-
pears to be an important indication of the "state supportive presumption" identified by Profes-
sor Wiggins. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. Recognizing that the state could have
enacted the Nuclear Laws while using the economic rationale as a ruse, as the petitioners
argued, the Court refused to look beyond the stated legislative purpose and held that "it
should be up to Congress to determine whether a state has misused the authority left in its
hands." Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 103 S. Ct. at 1728.
52. Id. at 1729.
53. Id. at 1731. See also 42 U.S.C. § 2013(b) (1976).
54. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 103 S. Ct. at 1729-30.
55. Id. at 1732 (emphasis added).
56. Justice Blackmun found a clear distinction "between the threshold determination
whether to permit the construction of new nuclear plants and, if the decision is to permit
construction, the subsequent determinations of how to construct and operate those plants. The
threshold decision belongs to the State; the latter decisions are for the NRC." Id. at 1733
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
57. Although [The Atomic Energy Act] reserves to the NRC decisions about
B. The Impact of Pacific Gas & Electric
It still is difficult to know the precise implications of the Pacific
Gas & Electric decision for state actions related to nuclear power.
The Court emphasized the legislative history and statutory provi-
sions and indicated that states have retained authority over economic
and other traditional state regulatory matters. Presumably, any state
action addressing economic issues or the need for or the siting of
nuclear facilities would not be preempted. A state thus could decide
to halt work on a reactor that is under construction, to prevent the
operation of a completed reactor, or even to halt the operation of an
existing reactor that already has begun to generate electricity. The
state would need only to indicate, through legislative history, regula-
tory decision or otherwise, that the action is taken for economic rea-
sons. As in Pacific Gas & Electric and as is required by the princi-
ples generally applied, the Court presumably would accept the
state's rationale.56 Thus, state actions would be immune from federal
preemption even if they had a far more immediate effect than the
ban on future reactors in the California Nuclear Laws.59
A major question about the effect of state actions taken for non-
safety reasons is the import of the Court's conclusion that the pro-
motion of nuclear power is a primary purpose of the Atomic Energy
Act.60 The Court rejected the position, adopted by the circuit court
how to build and operate nuclear plants, the Court reads too much into the Act
in suggesting that it also limits the States' traditional power to decide what types
of electric power to utilize. Congress simply has made the nuclear option availa-
ble. Rather than rest on the elusive test of legislative motive, therefore, I would
conclude that the decision whether to build nuclear plants remains with the
States. In my view, a ban of construction of nuclear power plants would be valid
even it its authors were motivated by fear of a core meltdown or other nuclear
catastrophe.
Id. at 1735.
58. See U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1968). Generally, the Court does not
look beyond the legislature's stated purpose.
59. It may be that states or state agencies do not have the authority to halt the construc-
tion of previously approved facilities or to take other actions similar to those suggested in this
article. See, e.g., Appeal of Public Service Co. of New Hampshire, No. 82-366 (N.H., filed
December 27, 1982), holding that the New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission had no
authority to prevent the use of revenue from a securities issuance for the construction of Unit
No. 2 at the Seabrook nuclear facility, even if the PUC's purpose was to protect the financial
health of the company. This is a matter of state law that must be addressed in each case and is
not within the scope of this article.
Similarly, this article does not address the authority of local governments to take actions
that affect nuclear power, either in the economic arena or with respect to other matters, in-
cluding the psychological health issues discussed below. Unlike states, local governments are
not sovereigns that have chosen to limit their powers, but are creations of the state. McQUIL-
LEN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS vol. 1 at 46, 83, 142-43 (3d ed. 1971). Thus,
local governments may be limited to actions that are specifically authorized by state law. Id. at
208-09. Again, this issue must be examined in every case. If the local government has suffi-
cient authority, however, the preemption analysis would remain the same. An action of the
locality is, in theory, an action of the state. Id. at 209; id. vol. 5 at 403-09.
60. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 103 S. Ct. at 1731.
and by Justices Blackmun and Stevens, that recent legislation indi-
cated a change in the outlook of Congress and embraced the position
that the statutory purpose of promoting nuclear power has "consid-
erable force."6' The Court, therefore, may have felt it necessary to
emphasize the legislative history and statutory provisions indicating
that states retained authority over economic and similar issues, to
overcome a conflict preemption obstacle.
The Court stressed, however, that "the promotion of nuclear
power is not to be accomplished 'at all costs,' "62 and that the state
supportive presumption"s would support state action in areas over
which the NRC has no jurisdiction. Otherwise, there would be a
"regulatory vacuum," which the Court found to be inconceivable for
economic issues addressed by the Nuclear Laws."
Confronted with the possibility of such a vacuum, the Court
should uphold the state action and leave to Congress the determina-
tion whether states should address nonsafety issues, or whether such
issues should be preempted by the NRC or some other federal au-
thority. To hold otherwise would be to require affirmative action by
Congress to remedy a problem that the state already has found to be
serious enough to justify state action.
A proper balancing of state and federal interests should permit
the states to act until Congress explicitly precludes them from act-
ing. If the congressional purpose of promoting nuclear power is so
strong that it overcomes state concerns in nonsafety areas, Congress
presumably will act to clarify that point. This approach assures that
the problem identified by the state will be addressed and resolved by
the political system. A ruling that the state action is preempted be-
cause of the congressional purpose of promoting nuclear power, even
though the action involves an issue outside the jurisdiction of the
NRC, would mean that the problem identified by the state would
probably go unattended and unresolved; the political system would
not be forced to address it.
III. State Authority to Regulate Nuclear Reactors to Protect Psy-
chological Health
There is little doubt that the United States Supreme Court
would not uphold a reactor ban based upon fear of a nuclear catas-
trophe.6 5 The Court presumably would hold that such fear arises
61. Id. at 1732. See Xerox Corp. v. County of Harris, 51 U.S.L.W. 40, 41 (1982), in
which a similarly general federal purpose was held to prevent state action under the conflict
doctrine.
62. 103 S. Ct. at 1731.
63. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
64. 103 S. Ct. at 1724.
65. Only Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Stevens, would uphold a state ban moti-
from dissatisfaction with the degree of safety assured by NRC regu-
lations and thus falls within the preempted field of "nuclear safety
concerns." 66 This article, however, does not focus on state action mo-
tivated by simple fear of a nuclear accident. Rather, like PANE's
contentions in the Three Mile Island litigation,6 7 this article dis-
cusses state attempts to prevent or to mitigate the psychological
health damage that may arise from the operation of a nuclear
reactor.
Two points illustrate the distinction between nuclear safety con-
cerns and nuclear power's effect on psychological health. First, as
alleged by PANE, the psychological health damage related to nu-
clear power "[iln some cases. . .leads to incapacitation or suicidal
tendencies. '" Such a serious condition is not mere fear, and the
state action is not motivated simply by a political disagreement on
the degree of safety provided by the NRC.69 Second, while the Su-
preme Court has held that the Atomic Energy Act answers the polit-
ical question whether the nation should develop nuclear energy, 0 the
District of Columbia Circuit Court has limited the scope of that an-
swer by requiring only assurances of protection against physical
health damage, not against psychological health damage. 1 Congress
has not addressed the problem of serious psychological health dam-
age that might arise from the operation of a nuclear reactor.
The application of most of the preemption principles discussed
in Pacific Gas & Electric to state efforts to prevent or to mitigate the
psychological harm that could arise from the operation of a nuclear
reactor is relatively straightforward. Only the fifth test, whether
vated by safety concerns: "In my view, a ban on construction of nuclear power plants would be
valid even if its authors were motivated by fear of a core meltdown or other nuclear catastro-
phe." Id. at 1735 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
66. 103 S. Ct. at 1726.
67. Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy (PANE), 103 S. Ct.
1556 (1983).
68. Brief for Respondent at 21 n.37, id. (citing AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC Assoc., DIAG-
NOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 237 (3d ed. 1980)).
69. It is worth noting that Pacific Gas & Electric Co., with Justice Blackmun's state-
ment about state action based upon fear of a nuclear catastrophe, was issued on April 20,
1983, the day after the Court issued its PANE decision. Justice Blackmun probably had the
PANE case in mind when he wrote his concurring opinion. If his reference to "fear" reflected
his reading of PANE's allegation of psychological health damage, it may be that the Court
decided PANE on the erroneous premise that the alleged health damage was not particularly
serious and represented only a political disagreement, rather than an issue worthy of profes-
sional attention from trained psychologists or psychiatrists. The Court's discussion of the mat-
ter presents this possibility. See PANE, 103 S. Ct. at 1563. Although such a misimpression
might have changed the Court's visceral reaction to the case, it would not have changed the
outcome. Whether mild anxiety or suicidal mania, the health damage would not have been
cognizable under NEPA in the absence of a stronger connection to the physical environment.
Theoretically at least, the degree of severity of the harm would not have changed the result.
Id.
70. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRC, 435 U.S. 519, 557-58 (1978).
71. See supra notes 1-15 and accompanying text.
"state law 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and objec-
tives of Congress,' "72 raises any potentially significant question con-
cerning the states' freedom to act.
First, psychological health damage is a matter with which the
federal government is not concerned. As a result of the circuit
court's PANE decision, the Atomic Energy Act does not encompass,
and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has no jurisdiction over,
psychological health damage that may arise from the operation of
nuclear reactors.7 The Commission's similar lack of jurisdiction over
the economic consequences of nuclear power formed the basis for the
Pacific Gas & Electric decision upholding an assertion of state
power. Thus, no question of explicit preemption exists, and the Pa-
cific Gas & Electric result should control in the absence of some
overriding indication that a legitimate state health concern should be
ignored.
Second, under the state supportive presumption, virtually any
state activity is entitled to great deference.74 The strength of this
presumption is evident in the Court's position in Arkansas Electric
Cooperative v. Arkansas Public Service Commission, upholding
Arkansas' regulation of the wholesale electric rates of a rural electric
cooperative even though such regulation had been considered pre-
empted in the past as a direct burden on interstate commerce. Thus,
even if the state action does not address an area in which the state
traditionally has acted, the state's concerns and actions will be re-
garded as legitimate and upheld in the absence of compelling reasons
mandating a contrary result.
In Pacific Gas & Electric, the Court emphasized that states
have a "traditional responsibility in the field of regulating electrical
utilities for determining questions of need, reliability, cost and other
related state concerns." ' This standard analysis presumably placed
California in an even more favorable position than Arkansas occu-
pied when the Court later upheld that state's regulation of the
wholesale rates charged by rural electric cooperatives. If the Arkan-
sas case does represent a heightened deference to all state actions,
the deference given to California in Pacific Gas & Electric may re-
flect a super state supportive presumption when the issue concerns
an area in which the state traditionally has acted and has been
responsible.
72. Pac. Gas & Elec, Co., 103 S. Ct. at 1722 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S.
52, 67 (1941)).
73. PANE v. NRC, 678 F.2d 222, 254 (D. C. Cir. 1982).
74. Wiggins, supra note 20, at 27.
75. 51 U.S.L.W. 4539 (1983).
76. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 103 S. Ct. at 1723.
A. A Super State Supportive Presumption
State action to protect against psychological health damage
should be entitled to a super state supportive presumption. Psycho-
logical health is an integral part of human health. Nothing is more
fundamental to the states' traditional police powers than the author-
ity and responsibility to protect human health.
Although states apparently have not attempted to regulate nu-
clear power or any other industry in the past for the express purpose
of preventing or mitigating psychological health damage, such an ac-
tion is not outside the traditional police power functions that are en-
titled to substantial deference. States may not have recognized the
problem in the past or may not have considered the problem to be
serious enough to require legislation or regulation. It may be that the
ability to recognize such health damage has arisen only recently. In
some cases, the type of psychological health damage at issue may be
unique to circumstances of a given industry, in this case nuclear
power, or it may be a relatively new phenomenon. 7 That states now
have decided to protect health from a danger, which they never the
saw the need to protect against before, does not remove the issue
from the states' traditional realm. Moreover, states traditionally
have addressed psychological injury in the context of tort litigation.78
A decision to regulate an activity to prevent or mitigate psychologi-
cal health damage is simply a decision to address the problem before
the harm actually occurs. Thus, affirmative state action regarding
the psychological effects of nuclear power is merely a variation on
that which states have been doing for many years. Such state action
should be entitled to the same degree of deference as the economic
regulation addressed in Pacific Gas & Electric.
B. The Occupation Test
Despite the clear decline of the occupation preemption doctrine,
the Court has reaffirmed its vitality in Pacific Gas & Electric, at
least with respect to "the entire field of nuclear safety concerns."''7
The crucial issue under the occupation test is whether regulation
based upon psychological health concerns falls within that field. The
issue's resolution depends upon whether the occupied field is broadly
or narrowly defined.
The evolution of the Court's treatment of this issue within the
past decade indicates that the Court applies the occupation preemp-
77. See, e.g., Vyner, The Psychological Effects of Ionizing Radiation, CULTURE, MED.
& PSYCHIATRY (1984).
78. See PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 49-62 (4th ed. 1971).
79. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 103 S. Ct. at 1726; see supra notes 34-56 and accompany-
ing text.
tion doctrine in very few cases, and then the Court will apply it very
narrowly.80 In City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal,8" which
Professor Wiggins identifies as the take-off point for the development
of a relatively coherent preemption standard,82 the decision turned
on the scope of the field occupied by federal regulation of aircraft
activity. The majority found that federal control extended to virtu-
ally all aspects of managing the national airspace and thus pre-
empted local attempts to control airport noise during takeoffs and
landings. The dissent found a narrower federal scheme and distin-
guished control over aircraft while in flight from control during take-
offs and landings.83 The dissenters thus would have given state action
great deference whenever possible.
Goldstein v. California84 began to tip the analysis toward the
Burbank dissenters by requiring that an issue be "necessarily na-
tional in import" to preclude state action in the absence of a conflict
between state and federal schemes. The principle embodied in the
Burbank dissent was virtually adopted by the Court in Merrill,
Lynch v. Ware.8' The Court upheld a California law prohibiting con-
tracts in restraint of trade against a challenge based upon a New
York Stock Exchange rule that required arbitration of disputes in-
volving termination of employment. The Court stated: "Our analysis
is also to be tempered by the conviction that the proper approach is
to reconcile the operation of both statutory schemes with one another
rather than holding one completely ousted."86
These decisions and principles establish that state regulation of
nuclear power for the purpose of mitigating or preventing psycholog-
ical health damage should not be preempted under the occupation
preemption doctrine. The Supreme Court has defined the "field of
80. Indeed, but for the Court's reference to the occupation preemption principle in Pa-
cific Gas & Elec. Co., one could conclude that the doctrine is virtually dead. It was nearly
eliminated as a distinct basis for decisions in New York State Dep't of Social Serv. v. Dublino,
413 U.S. 405, 415 (1973), and was strongly criticized as being of little use to the analysis in
DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 359-60 n.8 (1976). Moreover, the doctrine appears to have
virtually no force when called upon to serve as the basis for a finding of preemption. See supra
notes 37-38 and accompanying text. Since the Court's reference to the occupation doctrine in
Pac. Gas &Elec. Co. is dictum, the apparent strength of the Court's statement may not be a
true indication of the current vitality of the doctrine.
81. 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
82. Wiggins, supra note 20, at 28.
83. 411 U.S. at 644 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist was joined by Justices
Stewart, White and Marshall.
84. 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973) (emphasis in original).
85. 414 U.S. 117 (1973).
86. Id. at 127 (citing Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 367 (1963)). In
1978, the Court illustrated the extent to which it will seek to uphold state actions. In Ray v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 179-80 (1978), the Court drew a fine distinction between
tanker design standards and size limitations, as opposed to tugboat escort requirements based
upon tanker size. The Court held the former to be federally preempted; the latter were found
not to be preempted.
nuclear safety concerns" as "the radiological safety aspects involved
in the construction and operation of a nuclear plant. '8 7 This defini-
tion is evident in the analyses courts have applied to preempt state
regulation of radioactive waste hazards and to exclude nonradioac-
tive effects from consideration under the Atomic Energy Act. In
these decisions, courts have held that the Atomic Energy Act's pro-
tection of public health and safety is limited to the "special hazards
of radioactivity" and does not extend to health damage from the
thermal pollution caused by a nuclear reactor.88 The concept of nu-
clear safety has been further refined by the circuit court's PANE
decision specifically to exclude from that concept threats to psycho-
logical health, as opposed to threats to physical health from radia-
tion exposure. These decisions establish that state regulation to pro-
tect psychological health is not within the field of nuclear safety
concerns encompassed by the Atomic Energy Act.
More than the mere logic of prior decisions supports the conclu-
sion that state actions to protect psychological health are excluded
from from the "field of nuclear safety" governed by the Atomic En-
ergy Act. If such actions were not excluded, the Court would place
these state actions in the same category as actions based upon "fear
of a core meltdown or other nuclear catastrophe" 89 and could treat
them as nuclear safety matters already determined by Congress to
be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NRC. Such categorization
would be erroneous. First, the issue is one of a recognized health
threat, a concern well within the states' traditional police powers.
Once a state has recognized the threat and has taken a protective
position, the question is no longer a simple political matter, but is a
question of the state's Constitutional right to exercise its police
powers.
Second, the degree of psychological health damage that could
arise from the operation of a nuclear reactor may have no relation-
ship to the actual degree of safety assured by the NRC. Assuming
that the accident at Three Mile Island caused widespread mental
health damage, as PANE asserted, it did so even though the reactor
was in apparent conformance with NRC requirements, and no physi-
cal harm was immediately evident. Similar psychological health
damage may well be suffered as the result of a future nuclear acci-
dent, even if the public ultimately is protected from radiation
damage.90
87. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 103 S. Ct. at 1726.
88. See id. at 1726 n24; Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th
Cir. 1977), affd, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972); New Hampshire v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 406
F.2d 170 (Ist Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 962 (1969).
89. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 103 S. Ct. at 1735 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
90. Moreover, as PANE alleged, the restart of a reactor in which an accident already
The psychological consequences of an accident at a nuclear re-
actor are a legitimate state concern. The Atomic Energy Act would
preempt state action under the occupation doctrine only if the NRC
were required to protect against these consequences. The NRC
might attempt to achieve such protection by mandating safety stan-
dards that are more strict than necessary to assure physical safety,
by delaying or placing conditions upon reactor operation, or by
prohibiting reactor operation completely. The appropriate action
would depend upon the nature of the particular potential psychologi-
cal health damage. Action of this type, however, is exactly the action
that the Commission refused to take, and the Commission's refusal
has been upheld.
Thus, special actions relating to the assurance of the psychologi-
cal health of a population surrounding a nuclear reactor are not
within the field of nuclear safety concerns regulated under the
Atomic Energy Act and are not preempted under the occupation
doctrine. A state, therefore, may ban nuclear reactors to protect psy-
chological health.
If Pennsylvania had known that the accident at Three Mile Is-
land was imminent or was likely to occur, the Commonwealth could
have prohibited the construction or operation of Three Mile Island.
Pennsylvania also could have ordered the shutdown of TMI-2 and of
all other reactors with the same accident potential, to prevent the
psychological health damage that occurred during the accident.
Moreover, Pennsylvania could prevent, the restart of TMI-1. The
Commonwealth could determine, as PANE alleged," that the restart
would cause unacceptable psychological damage regardless of the
actual degree of safety. The residents of the municipalities near TMI
already have been traumatized by the accident at TMI-2 and are
susceptible to further harm caused by even the safe operation of an-
other reactor. This harm is distinct from harm caused by an accident
that eventually might occur at the reactor. For the reasons discussed
above, state action to prevent this harm should not be preempted.
C. The Conflict Test
Pacific Gas & Electric raises the possibility of conflict preemp-
tion even when states act for reasons not within the field of nuclear
safety, if the states' actions are taken for noneconomic reasons or for
other reasons that are not addressed in the statute or in the legisla-
tive history."' Such a decision by a court would be tantamount to
has occurred may cause psychological health damage even if the reactor is absolutely safe.
Brief for Respondent at 30 n.53, Metropolitan Edison Co. v. Pane, 103 S. Ct. 1556 (1983).
91. Id.
92. See supra notes 34-56 and accompanying text.
holding that federal purposes are presumed to preempt state actions
even when the state actions are not within the field occupied by fed-
eral authority. Only congressional enactment or legislative discussion
identifying areas of permissible state action would prevent
preemption.
This standard would preempt state action taken to protect psy-
chological health if the action either banned or seriously impeded the
development of nuclear power. The standard also would eliminate
the "state supportive presumption" and would be contrary to the re-
cent evolution of preemption theory. In light of the states' traditional
role in protecting health, including psychological health, and the Su-
preme Court's preemption doctrines, a court should uphold state ac-
tion that does not directly interfere with NRC regulation of nuclear
safety, even if the state action effectively prohibits the location of
new reactors in the state or forces the shutdown of existing reactors.
Moreover, recent Supreme Court discussion of the conflict doc-
trine reemphasizes the force of the state supportive presumption.
Under Rice v. Norman Williams Co.,9s a hypothetical or potential
conflict between federal and state laws is not a sufficient basis for
preemption. Rather, there must be an "irreconcilable conflict." This
language strengthens the position of the states and indicates that the
scope of exclusive federal authority will be read narrowly to allow
the state to act whenever possible.
IV. Forms of State Regulation
Pacific Gas & Electric and the preceding discussion have ad-
dressed state action that bans nuclear power or prevents the opera-
tion of nuclear reactors. State actions to protect against psychologi-
cal health damage need not be so drastic. They can include efforts to
regulate or control the operation of nuclear reactors to protect psy-
chological health while stopping short of a ban on nuclear reactors.
Ironically, it is here that state actions may be preempted under the
conflict doctrine.
One approach to mitigating psychological reactions to reactor
operation might be to require additional safety measures beyond
those mandated by the NRC. This approach could cause one of two
results. First, there may be a direct conflict between the NRC re-
quirements and the state requirements, and it may be impossible for
the nuclear plant operator to comply with both. Moreover, the state
action might interfere with or complicate the safety measures re-
quired by the NRC. Such action unquestionably would be pre-
empted under the conflict doctrine.
93. 102 S. Ct. 3294, 3299 (1982).
Second, the state requirement may be simply in addition to re-
quirements imposed by the NRC. For example, the state might re-
quire an additional containment structure to surround the one al-
ready required by the NRC.94 Although technically not necessary to
assure safety, the additional structure might serve as the assurance
necessary to prevent psychological harm, particularly among a previ-
ously traumatized population in which such a symbol of safety pro-
tection might be particularly significant.
This type of state regulation would cause no "irreconcilable con-
flict." If challenged, the state could prevail. The result, however, is
nearly inconceivable as a practical matter. The court inevitably
would find itself in a factual dispute regarding whether the addi-
tional requirement actually interfered with the NRC's control of nu-
clear safety. If any doubt were present, the court either would ac-
cede to the claim that a conflict existed, or it would consider any
such requirement to be within the occupied field of nuclear safety
because, although the state requirement addressed a distinct issue of
psychological harm, it did so through an attempt to increase safety
to the point that the public no longer would be concerned. Even
though this is precisely the sort of action that the NRC might take if
it could regulate to protect psychological health damage, a court
probably would not uphold such an action by a state.
One of the major sources of stress at Three Mile Island was a
serious lack of accurate information." Another may have been be-
cause the near catastrophe was not caused by uncontrollable natural
events, but by the utility company itself, which consistently was
over-optimistic and refused to admit the serious nature of the cri-
sis. 17 A possible state response to limit ps ,chological harm from
these causes would be to require the utility to accept a permanent
on-site state monitoring official or team, whose job it would be to
obtain first-hand information and thereby to assure that the public is
kept accurately informed. This also might help to alleviate the feel-
94. The containment is a large steel-reinforced concrete structure that houses the steel
reactor vessel, in which the chain reaction takes place. It is the last barrier protecting the
public if the reactor vessel suffers a major radiation leak, as it did at Three Mile Island. This
discussion assumes that such a containment would not interfere with reactor safety systems
under NRC regulations. The author is without the expertise to evaluate the technical issue; the
example is for illustrative purposes only and is not to suggest that such a requirement is feasi-
ble or sensible or that it would mitigate psychological harm.
95. Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 102 S. Ct. at 3299.
96. President's Commission Report on the Accident at Three Mile Island at 13, 40, 126-
30.
97. Id. at 19. Titchener & Kapp, Family and Character Change at Buffalo Creek, 113
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 295, 297, 299 (1976) (stating that human responsibility for a disaster may
increase the severity of psychological impact); AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC Assoc., DIAGNOSTIC
AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 236 (3d ed. 1980) (noting that post-trau-
matic stress disorder apparently is more severe and lasts longer when a human being creates
the stress).
ing that the disaster was the responsibility of uncaring officials and
thus might alleviate some of the psychological harm.98 Such an ap-
proach would not involve a conflict and would not change the NRC's
regulation of nuclear safety at all. Activity of this nature by a state
should not be preempted.
V. Conclusion
When the Nuclear Regulatory Commission chose to argue, and
the circuit court agreed, that the Atomic Energy Act mandate to
protect human health did not extend to protection of human psycho-
logical health, the Commission lost control of the issue. The Act does
not authorize or require the Commission to protect psychological
health, and, therefore, the Act does not preempt states and localities
from doing so. An effort to protect psychological health could be-
come a major focus of the political struggle over nuclear power. Lo-
cal and state actions to ban or regulate nuclear power to protect psy-
chological health should be upheld in most circumstances unless
Congress dictates otherwise.
98. Id.
